Disbelief ensues...

Today Thailand's ruling military junta announced the new interim Prime Minister, the respected ex-general Surayud Chulanont. This keeps the schedule the junta enacted during the takeover less than two weeks ago, and I suppose that Mr Surayud ex-military status might qualify him as the "civilian" leader the army promised. The Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional Monarchy (CDRM) (the junta's unwieldy public name) is proceeding with extensive investigations into allegations of corruption and vote-rigging under the prior regime. Other new agencies have been set up to ensure economic and political stability in the next year leading up to the free elections the government has pledged. The coup, in short, is going as smoothly as could possibly have been hoped for.

So why am I more uneasy about Thailand's future than when the coup first occured?

Several reasons, methinks, all of which are painfully rooted in a thousand historical examples. The first: the CDRM has been quietly issuing a series of pronouncements restricting unauthorized political activities: public protests, grassroots meetings, and other foundations of functional democracy. Though last week's media blackout has inevitably ended - the junta couldn't have perpetuated it even if they'd tried - and no troops have (to my knowledge) been enforcing the new restrictions, I am not reassured. I can't shake the feeling that these pronouncements are meant to create a sort of semi-legal "Hey, we warned you!" foundation for a future crackdown. If the junta were truly dedicated to (re)building a civilian democracy, shouldn't they be encouraging a noisy public debate right now? I've seen no word of expiration date, so there's no way to know when these restrictions will be lifted. Moreover, the army promises to "assist" the new government and ensure its smooth and clean function, a menacing proclamation they apparently consider reassuring. Protests and politics will come - they always do - and these measures put the lie to the CDRM's stated determination to return their power to the people of Thailand.

The second ill portent is the foul feeling I get every time I read the newspaper's opinion and letters section. One writer to yesterday's Bangkok Post argues that "General Sonthi and his troops [the coup's leaders, naturally] should be commended for a job well done", while another proclaims the coup "a wonderful opportunity... to achieve a better democratic climate for the entire nation" and decries the disheartening "global condemnation coming from world leaders". The opinion pieces are, with few exceptions, similarly glowing, as they have been for weeks. More than eighty percent of polled Thais profess approval for the coup, and even the most thoughtful criticism has been muted and damn hard to find.

Shouldn't I be reassured, since the Thais have a far better grasp of their country's politics than I do? You'd think so, but I keep coming back to one of history's ugliest lessons: democracies become tyrannies with the full consent of the governed. From the Roman Republic to Nazi Germany to Bush's America we see the same pattern - the public, riven by fear and frustration, welcomes new overlords who promise security and stability. Even George Bloody Lucas had it right in Star Wars Episode III (obligatory nerd reference) "So this is how liberty dies... to thunderous applause." In this I'm appalled by the Thais' terrible grasp of history - especially their own history. Thailand has seen twenty-three coups in the last 80 years, none of which restored democracy or devolved power to the people. The Economist informs me that during the last coup, in 1991, the public responded much as they have this time - by welcoming the troops in the streets and thanking them for overthrowing a corrupt and unpopular government. As time wore on and the military clutched the reins long past their due, the public mood soured, leading to a wave of unrest that culminated in the slaughter of hundreds of Bangkok protesters. Yet no one in Thailand seems to be drawing much attention to those ugly days.

Which brings me, after a very lengthy post, to my third and final point. Men who take power by force do not willingly relinquish it. I know that, as a good political scientist, I shouldn't make such generalizations, and there are a handful of marginal examples that prove me wrong. But there have been thousands of coups and other military takeovers throughout history, and vanishingly few have returned the power back to civilians without a fight. This is precisely why the line between civilian and military power must be so rigid, and the military always under civilian control. Thaksin, the ousted Prime Minister, was a foul and corrupt leader despite his few good policies, and he deserved to be turfed from office. But the political wheels were turning, however slowly, and there was little to justify crossing the line into outright military control. It's immensely disheartening to see that the Thai public seems not to have learned this critical lesson, and each new fragment of press coverage diminishes my hopes for a peaceful outcome.

Will there be bloodshed? I think so. It's no sure thing - depending immensely on how the junta conducts itself in coming weeks - and it won't happen now or next month, but it's getting increasingly hard to see how this will end without violence. It's a very sobering thought.